Filly Buster

Mickey Kaus points out that the judicial filibuster deal may simply be a way to keep Congress corrupt:

The filibuster's infrastructural role has powerful multiplier effect: It means not only that obscure minority Senators attract millions in campaign contributions. while the aides of obscure minority Senators aides find pleasant $250,000 jobs as influencers with vital "access." It means that those Senators can afford to hire well-paid fundraisers to funnel those contributions, while interest groups need direct mail experts to raise the money to make their own "access" producing contributions, and all these people need restaurants like The Palm to feed them and brokers to swap their houses and mechanics to service their Acuras and Audis. Thanks to the Senate's precious right of unlimited debate, a wave of prosperity sweeps over the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area! Funded by the rest of the country.

Probably true. Still, while Kaus' admitted cynicism cuts through the high rhetoric, the filibuster (on judicial nominees or other matters) is worth defending, and ought to appeal to both parties. Democrats should appreciate this deal because it favors them (as Kaus noted 12 hours earlier) and largely guarantees them a seat at the table, and Republicans should appreciate it as upholding the values of Republicanism that hold the United States as a democratic but constitutional republic where minority rights are equal to those of the majority, as opposed to the majority autocracy of direct democracy. The ad hoc coalition kept mob rule away from the most powerful branch of government. That is cause for celebration.

I do support the calls for a supermajority vote on judges that have some folks upset, although America's Founding Fathers considered one version of such a vote (from The Founder's Constitution, via Althouse):

Mr. Madison, suggested that the Judges might be appointed by the Executives with the concurrence of 1/3 at least of the 2d. branch. This would unite the advantage of responsibility in the Executive with the security afforded in the 2d. branch agst. any incautious or corrupt nomination by the Executive.

My own observation is that, unlike staff appointments and general legislation, judicial appointments last for life and are supposedly non-partisan. I care very little about whether the "2d. branch" and the Executive are working well together compared to whether we see fair & effective judges on the bench. We need justices more than half the country can respect, otherwise "Judicial activism!" becomes the rallying cry whenever a decision proves unpopular and appointees become little more than political pawns. Supermajorities force the government to either get along or get distracted. Either option works for me. A supermajority requirement for judicial nominees seems like a good, easy way to restore some lost faith in the system.

If I am wrong? Interest groups are paying off senators anyway (they do that everywhere; it is one of those international traditions you're always hearing about), so we might as well make it cost them.